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The phrase ‘ever closer union’ has been a stated goal of the European integration project since its
inclusion in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, but following Brexit is it now time to reassess the direction
of the integration process? Pol Morillas writes that with radically diﬀerent integration ambitions now
present among the member states, a strategy of ‘ﬂexible diﬀerentiation’ would be far better suited to
the needs of Europe’s citizens.
The logic behind “ever closer union” had disappeared well before the Brexit referendum. When
negotiating a deﬁnitive opt-out from the clause, David Cameron revealed how the growing trend
towards integration had reached a symbolic limit, regardless of the referendum result. In that European Council of
February 2016, it became clear that the Lisbon Treaty had been the last attempt at pursuing the logic of ever deeper
integration and that member states were no longer united in the desire for “more Europe”.
The accession of the central and eastern European states in 2004 probably signalled the ﬁrst wave of enlargement
that understood the EU more in terms of a cost-beneﬁt analysis than a political project with a unity of purpose. In
their view, cooperation in international organisations should follow the utilitarian premise of amplifying national goals
rather than surrendering sovereignty and building a post-modern entity that ends the primacy of the state in world
politics.
A few years later, the euro crisis also fostered divisions across the EU along pragmatic lines. Debtor and creditor
countries were pursuing opposing recipes with regards to ﬁscal consolidation, debt mutualisation and the ﬁnal shape
of the Economic and Monetary Union. But the bottom line of their arguments was that the euro should beneﬁt
national goals, both in Berlin and Athens. Renationalisation of the priorities of EU member states reached a new
landmark with the refugee crisis, which revealed notable diﬀerences between eastern and western Europe and
between states and EU institutions.
Brexit was just the latest blow to ever closer union, albeit a highly symbolic one. Since the Brexit referendum, for the
ﬁrst time the EU has become a project that both enlarges and shrinks simultaneously; that deepens integration in
some policy areas and risk disintegration in others. The UK’s exit from the EU is certainly to blame, but the
disintegration dynamics are present in many other national landscapes, with Euroscepticism, populism and political
disaﬀection on the rise.
Brexit should be considered a turning point for the future of the European project. Today, as dangerous as national
referendums to approve a new treaty is the belief that a few “quick ﬁxes” will do to reform the EU project. So what
shape have the reform proposals put forward taken so far and what could be part of a process of strategic reﬂection
for the EU’s institutional reform?
Back to the classics
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The ﬁrst response to the EU’s crises has been to go back
to the idea that the union makes progress through crisis.
“More Europe” has been the traditional way to strengthen
European integration and “better Europe”, the reﬁning
mechanism for the EU’s institutional shortcomings. But
classic recipes rarely work in times of unprecedented
crisis, either nationally or continentally.
“More Europe” is unlikely to provide a solution to the
democratic malaise and anti-establishment feelings in
many national landscapes. And “better Europe” will not
work either if it does not address the fundamental
legitimacy problems at the EU level, where integration is
perceived as an excessively top-down process.
However, an important set of responses to the recent EU
crises has brought back the idea of more centralised
decision-making as a way forward. The latest phases of
the Five Presidents’ Report necessitate the setting up of
more centralised structures and supranational policies to
build a functional economic union.
The relocation scheme put forward by Jean-Claude
Juncker and later ignored by member states was built on
the central role of the Commission in shaping and
orchestrating national responses to the refugee crisis. And Brexit was seen as an opportunity to speed up European
integration, including in the ﬁeld of security and defence, by removing the pressure from an awkward partner and
renewing calls for the establishment of a European army.
The European Commission and the European Parliament have become the driving forces of the “integration through
crisis” method. But member states have not followed and the EU still needs to deliver on the reinforcement of the
Economic and Monetary Union, the reform of Schengen and the post-Brexit architecture.
The practical union
The second set of responses emphasises the need to focus ﬁrst on what could work, deliver on policy proposals and
then, if necessary, reform the EU’s institutional framework. Critics argue that this translates into muddling through
excessively turbulent times. But many of the recent proposals emanating from Brussels and European capitals have
followed the practical union logic, which underlines the need to build a functional EU on the one hand, and a project
that delivers on the other.
The response to the euro crisis has been characterised by a series of practical steps to keep the Eurozone together
under strong German leadership. These proposals have not been aimed at altering the foundations of the austerity
programmes or the existence of a monetary union without fully-ﬂedged economic and ﬁscal capacity. The response
to the refugee crisis has also witnessed an attempt to halt the ﬂow of refugees via the signing of an EU-Turkey
agreement, very much supported by Germany. The discussions of a joint immigration and asylum policy and a
comprehensive reform of Schengen have also been shelved.
Yet it is mostly in the area of the post-Brexit EU that European leaders have prioritised the practical union approach.
Following the British referendum, the EU has put forward a series of initiatives to reinforce certain EU policies that
are believed to be core concerns for both European citizens and Europe’s political leaders: the ﬁght against terrorism
and insecurity in neighbouring regions.
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The Bratislava Summit gave little indication as to the shape of the post-Brexit EU and focused instead on tackling
the refugee crisis via the reinforced security of external borders, the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement,
intensifying cooperation on information-sharing to prevent terrorism and moving forward on defence cooperation
through the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (the most promising area of implementation of the EU
Global Strategy so far).
However, there are problems associated with this approach to EU reform. The ﬁrst is that the understanding of
security (or at least the main concerns of European citizens) varies across nations. Crisis-ridden countries put more
weight on unemployment and the economic situation than Germany or Denmark, where immigration tops the list.
The second problem is that approaches based on deepening security and defence cooperation have been tried
before and not much progress has been made on the use of Permanent Structured Cooperation, a joint military
headquarters, intelligence-sharing mechanisms or the use of battlegroups, not to mention a joint EU army. The third
is that focusing on a “practical union” will hardly address the institutional deﬁcits provoking current dysfunctionalities
in the economic union, the issues around immigration or stronger security and defence. There is thus a risk of
derailing the whole process precisely because of a lack of ambition in tackling fundamental reforms.
The intergovernmental union
Whereas the practical union focuses on results, the “intergovernmental” EU focuses on the method. The academic
literature has explored the move of EU integration towards what has been termed a “new intergovernmentalism”,
and there is indeed abundant evidence that the euro crisis has reinforced the powers of member states in the
European integration process, particularly those of creditor countries. The Eurozone summits marginalised the
European Commission in the management of the crisis, except for an insuﬃcient Juncker Plan.
Viktor Orbán and the leaders of other central and eastern European states also became primary advocates of an
intergovernmental solution to the refugee crisis. Vehemently opposing the Commission’s relocation scheme, they
argued that asylum policies remain a national competence, so there is no obligation to implement the agreements
reached.
The bottom line of the current intergovernmental union is a shared feeling of transactional politics being lost. Under
a purely intergovernmental logic in which negotiating parties only seek to pursue national goals and where the
current crises have eroded the sense of a shared destiny, transactional politics are replaced by a logic of “connecting
vessels”.
Crisis management negotiations are today dominated by zero-sum dynamics, provoking recurrent spillovers from
one negotiation portfolio to another. Negotiations are thus used as a bargaining tool between member states, which
pursue national goals in crisis scenarios up to dangerous levels of political brinkmanship.
There is enough evidence of this. When European leaders were discussing the way out of the euro crisis, they came
up with the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism as ways to tackle the sovereign debt crisis. The
United Kingdom prevented the adoption of these agreements under the current EU treaty, thus forcing the adoption
of an international treaty instead. The Fiscal Compact became another diﬀerentiated integration project, to be
incorporated into EU law at a later stage.
Greece also threatened to veto the outcomes of the European Council of February 2016 at which the terms of a pact
with the United Kingdom were being negotiated before the Brexit referendum unless more realistic solutions to the
refugee crisis and the management of EU borders were agreed. For his part, the former Italian prime minister,
Matteo Renzi, threatened in October 2016 to block the forthcoming budget negotiations if European countries did
not abide by the commitment to accept more refugees.
Towards a logic of ﬂexible diﬀerentiation
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When EU member states have found diﬃculties in moving forward together, they have often used diﬀerentiated
integration as a way to overcome stalled negotiations or to negotiate a new agreement after failing to ratify EU
treaties. Diﬀerentiated integration is the rule rather than the exception in the EU, but has more often been used as a
last resort than as a well-structured plan for building a more ﬂexible Europe.
Today, the key assumption that diﬀerentiation enables integration to move forward is gone, since many countries do
not share the same vision vis-à-vis the ﬁnal destiny: “ever closer union” is shrinking back. As a consequence of the
multiple crises aﬀecting the EU, non-euro or Schengen members are not necessarily eager to join the ﬁrst-class
Europe, while the risk of EU disintegration after Brexit has increased and Eurosceptic movements are on the rise all
over the EU.
If unity on the European project is lacking and diﬀerentiated integration is showing its shortcomings, it is high time for
the EU to overcome the current void in strategic vision. This is unlikely to happen in the short term, due to the
elections looming in the Netherlands, France and Germany later this year. But given that treaty reform is usually a
long and cumbersome process, thorough discussions should start as soon as possible to make a ﬂexible form of
diﬀerentiated integration the model rather than the exception in EU integration.
EU leaders should start by acknowledging the limits of the intergovernmental union. The current intergovernmental
logic reinforces the tendency among member states to look after their national interests and poses serious
governance challenges in a union of 28 or 27 member states. Reform of the treaty is the ultimate example of the
current EU “institutional trap”, according to which member states will always have the possibility of blocking major
decisions as long as unanimity prevails.
The EU’s current functioning is subject to the tendency of national governments to be trapped in the political
discourse of Eurosceptic parties. So turning the EU into a regular international organisation where veto power
remains a possibility will not solve the current governance problems or provide a long-lasting solution to the union’s
multiple crises. A more intergovernmental union is destined to be the victim of a paralysing intergovernmentalism.
If the French and Dutch “no” to the constitution were considered turning points for European integration, Brexit
requires kick-starting a strategic reﬂection about the future steps and form of EU integration. The European Council
needs to overcome its tendency to micromanage crisis resolution mechanisms (as has been the case during the
Eurozone and refugee crises) and fulﬁl the role that the Lisbon Treaty provides for it as a strategic reﬂection body. If
that is not suﬃcient, European leaders should reconsider the establishment of a second Convention for Europe on
the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in March 2017 to facilitate strategic thinking.
To emerge from the current impasse, this strategic reﬂection should be built on a new understanding of diﬀerentiated
integration, based on ﬂexible diﬀerentiation. Flexibility should be based on the coexistence of various degrees of
membership, where a core group of states would reinforce cooperation in economic, mobility or defence issues.
Strong levels of institutionalisation would accompany deep integration in these policy domains.
So, for instance, if the UK wishes to remain part of the single market, this should come with full compliance with the
values attached to this policy (i.e. respect for the so-called four freedoms, including the freedom of movement for
workers). Otherwise, a more ﬂexible understanding of integration would need to contemplate new forms of
membership, which could be based on a “continental partnership” for the UK but would also be open to other current
non-EU members such as Ukraine or Turkey.
This “ﬂexibility across” states would delimit diﬀerent circles of integration, but if a country wished to be part of the
inner circle, it would have to conform to the core values attached to it. Outer circles could be based on softer degrees
of cooperation with fewer strings attached and in line with other current economic partnerships. The logic of
ﬂexibility across would enable the EU to move beyond the current dichotomy between “full membership” and “no
membership at all” and envisage multiple destinies for EU integration.
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In addition to ﬂexibility, diﬀerentiation should apply to the level of policy cooperation. In line with the current existence
of reinforced cooperation, a certain number of member states might wish to go further in their cooperation in the
ﬁelds of the monetary union or Schengen. Some willing states might want to consider setting-up a “mini-Eurozone”
or a “mini-Schengen”, where additional sovereignty on ﬁscal or asylum policies would be surrendered to central
authorities.
This “diﬀerentiation within” would enable going beyond the current Economic and Monetary Union and Schengen,
reinforcing cooperation in the inner circle of integration. Under this scheme, legitimacy and accountability would be
at the centre of policymaking from day one.
This system of ﬂexible diﬀerentiation might face ﬁerce criticism due to its complexity. It can be argued that it is
counter-intuitive because the union is too complex already. But it is not ﬂexible enough. After Brexit and the
economic and refugee crises, the EU has entered a phase in which integration ambitions are strikingly diﬀerent
among member states. The response to such dynamics is unlikely to work under the one-size-ﬁts-all logic of ever
closer union or a paralysing intergovernmentalism. Circumstances are ripe for a fully-ﬂedged reﬂection on how to
combine ﬂexibility and diﬀerentiation in the EU after Brexit.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. To ﬁnd out more, read the extended version of this paper at CIDOB. Image
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